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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is based on three Irish operational toll road Public Private Partnership (PPP) case 
studies, including interviews with 38 key stakeholders. Our findings show that the Irish 
Government’s treatment of risk and its transfer to the private partner in PPPs are changing over 
time. Regulatory changes, which have led to increased finance costs, coupled with a severe 
global economic crisis, have exacerbated the difficulties in funding PPPs. The goalposts in Irish 
PPPs appear to be changing in favour of the private partner at the expense of the taxpayers, who 
are the losers in the PPP game. The Government are suggesting that they may potentially step in, 
if projects experienced financial difficulty and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) may require 
specific guarantees in order to participate in future PPP projects. Pricing of demand risk also 
differs from the Government’s rhetoric that it is being priced realistically. In practice, we find 
that it is priced aggressively by the SPV in order to win PPP contracts. The paper discusses the 
possible implications of these findings for Value for Money (VFM) and, ultimately, taxpayers.  
 
 
Keywords: Public Private Partnerships, Value For Money, Change in Perceptions, Demand Risk 
Allocation and Transfer, Estimating Demand Risk, Toll Roads.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2 
 
 
When Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
1
 were first conceived risk management was not 
considered as one of the main issues by the public sector (Demirag et al., 2010).  Recent 
empirical studies on PPPs, have, however highlighted the importance of examining attitudes to 
risk, as risk has emerged as one of the crucial considerations in justifying and transferring more 
public services to the private sector.  The assessment and transfer of risk in PPPs largely 
determines whether or not a project is Value for Money (VFM) (Froud, 2003; Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008).  Broadbent et al. (2008) posit that the real 
challenge in determining VFM in PPP contracts lies with the calculation of retained risk by the 
public sector and the value of the transferred risk to the private sector as both involve subjective 
and qualitative judgements. Moreover, the lack of data collection to systematically evaluate 
whether PPP schemes provide effective risk transfer and represent VFM compared to other 
forms of procurement was also criticised in a recent National Audit Office (NAO) report (NAO, 
2011).  Arguably risk should be managed by the party who is better able to control risk factors 
(Froud, 2003) or is willing to bear it (Li et al., 2005; Hood et al., 2006).  
  
Prior literature on PPP risks have examined risk as a generic concept (Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos, 2008), and from primarily senior debt provider’s perspectives (Asenova and 
Beck, 2010). There is a dearth of literature examining perceptions of key stakeholders on how 
risk is actually transferred and priced in PPP contracts and why some key players have different 
interests and perceptions.  For example,  there is some evidence to suggest that in Australia the 
private sector has recently assumed more of the demand risk
2
 (Brown, 2005)  because the 
guarantees provided by the Australian Government reduced significant uncertainty (Alonso-
Conde et al., 2007).   Others have argued that the private sector was inept at managing demand 
risk and this may have been one of the reasons why the downside demand risk
3
 was underwritten 
by the state (Acerete et al., 2010).  More recently, Jupe (2011) examined publicly available 
documentary evidence in four UK transport case studies and concluded that the risk transfer 
from the Government to the private sector had not been substantial or effective, and the public 
                                                 
1
 Shaoul et al. (2012a, p.214) provide a definition of PPPs as ‘clearly defined projects, the risks and rewards of 
which are shared between the public and private sectors. That is usually a long-term relationship between a public 
sector procurer and multiple private sector companies exists to design and construct infrastructure, maintain it and 
provide some related services’.  
2
 Demand risk can be difficult to define and is often subject to diverse interpretations. For the purposes of this study 
our working definition for demand risk is the difference between anticipated and expected level of traffic volume 
(Shaoul et al., 2007). 
3
 This refers to when demand levels do not meet the expected levels in the SPVs bid estimates. 
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sector effectively underwrote the projects and was the lender of last resort.  However, none of 
these studies explore the perceptions of different types of financiers or Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV)
4
 members. 
 
Demirag et al. (2010) found that most of the risks assumed to be transferred to the SPV were in 
fact not managed by the SPV and instead were passed on to their subcontractors or privately 
insured. Given the level of risk diffusion by financiers to other stakeholders (Demirag et al., 
2011, 2012), it is interesting to study the extent to which risk diffusion is also evident in other 
PPP schemes, particularly in hard toll
5
 PPPs where a significant level of risk transfer from the 
public to the private sector occurs.  Demirag et al. (2011) focused on financiers’ perceptions of a 
number of risks in different sectors including roads, hospitals and education. This study extends 
this earlier work and contributes to the literature by examining the demand risk appetite of 
financiers and a number of other SPV members and key stakeholders in Irish road PPPs. The 
importance of demand risk is highlighted by the nature of the risk which, unlike other PPP risks 
examined in prior studies, cannot be passed on to other stakeholders as explained in detail later 
in this section. This paper attempts to fill this lacuna in research by examining the transfer and 
pricing of demand risk in three operational PPP toll road projects in Ireland.  
 
The paper focuses on PPPs in the transportation sector since transport PPPs form the majority of 
PPP investment in Ireland (Ireland’s National Development Plan, 2007), the UK (Shaoul et 
al.,2012b) and globally (Public Works Financing, 2011). Over 1000 PPP roads projects valued at 
$US 679.9 billion have been financed through PPPs worldwide between 1985-2011 (Public 
Works Financing, 2011). According to a recent study by the European PPP Expertise Centre 
(EPEC)
6
 (2013a) the transport sector, was the most significant sector in terms of PPPs in 2012, 
with €7 billion in expenditure.  This was more than treble the value of education PPPs, which 
was the second biggest sector (EPEC, 2013a).  Price Waterhouse Coopers (2005) suggest that a 
number of countries implement PPPs in the transport sector initially in order to ascertain if they 
                                                 
4
 According to Demirag et al. (2011, p. 295) ‘the SPV is normally owned by a consortium which, because of the 
holistic nature of the contracts, will typically include two or three companies with a range of skills necessary to 
finance, build and operate the required facilities. The SPV, which is usually a shell company, in turn subcontracts 
the finance, design, construction, maintenance and soft services to companies that are often related to shareholders’. 
5
 Hard toll PPPs refer to PPPs whereby the user pays a toll to use the PPP road. The private sector is remunerated by 
the toll revenue that they receive from the user. 
6
 EPEC is an expertise centre formed as a joint initiative between the European Investment Bank (EIB), European 
Commission and EU member states. It shares expertise and best practice on PPPs with all its members (EPEC, 
2013b).  
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offer VFM and the public sector have the requisite experience before developing them in other 
sectors.  
 
This study also makes an important contribution to PPP literature because demand risk in 
transport infrastructure PPPs is particularly different from other types of risks (which have been 
widely examined in prior literature), for two main reasons. Firstly, demand risk provides the 
basis for estimating expected income from tolls, which in turn determines the SPV’s own bid for 
the PPP project.  The lowest bid based on net present value will be successful.  Secondly, unlike 
design, construction and operational risks that can be priced and managed by subcontractors, 
demand risk may not be transferred by the SPV to subcontractors (Demirag et al., 2012); 
subcontractors cannot control many of the variables that influence it, such as National Income 
and fuel prices, thereby inhibiting demand risk transfer to subcontractors.  Other uncontrollable 
factors affecting demand risk include the inability of the SPV to set toll prices and alternative 
forms of transport being made available to road users.  
 
This paper seeks to address three main research questions. Firstly, what are the key stakeholders’ 
perceptions on how effectively demand risk is transferred from the public to the private sector in 
Irish hard toll PPPs? Secondly, what are the key stakeholders’ perceptions on how demand risk 
is actually priced by the SPV in Irish hard toll PPPs ? Thirdly, has the Government changed its 
objectives on transferring risk from the public to the private sector?  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section provides a brief overview 
of PPPs in Ireland, followed by a summary of recent changes in the regulatory framework and 
how these have impacted on the PPP market. We then discuss the relevant prior literature on risk 
and uncertainty with particular emphasis on how demand risk is transferred and priced in 
different types of roads.  This is followed by Governmental guidelines and documentation on 
how risk should be transferred and priced in PPPs. The next section discusses the research 
methods used and the findings of the study. Finally we discuss these findings and provide some 
concluding comments.  
 
 
 
 
2. An Overview of PPPs in Ireland     
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PPPs were initially introduced in Ireland under the National Development Plan (NDP) in 1999 
across a range of sectors including education and roads.  PPPs have helped to significantly 
reduce Ireland’s infrastructure deficit. A detailed analysis of PPPs in procurement and operation 
in Ireland can be seen on the Irish government’s PPP website (http://ppp.gov.ie/) and more 
extensive detail on the roads sector can be found on the National Roads Authority (NRA)
7
 
website (www.nra.ie). In the Republic of Ireland, a significant number of foreign firms with 
experience and international expertise have invested in Irish PPPs. An interdepartmental group 
on PPPs, as well as an informal advisory group, have also been established to develop the PPP 
process in Ireland. These groups comprise of a number of key stakeholders, including the private 
sector, unions and Government representatives (Public Private Informal Advisory Group, 2001) 
(See Figure 1 provided in Appendices for an overview of the key stakeholders involved in the 
Irish roads PPP sector).  
 
The Republic of Ireland adheres to the guidelines produced by Eurostat in 2004 regarding the 
balance sheet treatment of PPPs. The assets of PPP projects that are privately funded are  
considered off balance sheet in the National Accounts (Department of Finance, 2006a, p.36).  The 
construction costs will not impact on the General Government Balance upfront during the 
construction period, provided that the private sector partner is allocated the construction risk and 
bears either the demand or the availability risk. The unitary payments however will be considered 
as part of the General Government Balance expenditure in the years in which they are incurred 
over the contracts duration (Department of Finance, 2006a, p.36). 
 
Under Ireland’s NDP 2007-2013, €13.35 billion8 has been earmarked for PPPs, with €11.21 
billion being funded by unitary payments and just over €1.9 billion by user charges, primarily 
through toll charges in road PPPs.
9
  The transport sector, with approximately €8.9 billion (67%) 
                                                 
7
 The NRA is a semi-state body responsible for procuring Irish roads. Under Section 17 of the Roads Act, 1993, the 
NRA is responsible for Irish National roads (Department of Transport Tourism and Sport, 2010). 
8
 This €13.35 billion refers to PPP capital investment. According to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (CAG) (2012) future contractual commitments in terms of PPPs are expected to be approximately €6.4 
billion. The outstanding commitment in terms of NRA projects is €1.689 billion. These contractual commitments 
relate to operational payments on the PPPs over the life of the projects. Future costs in terms of traffic guarantees 
are not included in these estimates. The next tranche of PPPs in Irish roads will be based on unitary payments 
(CAG, 2012).  
9
 Unitary payments refer to fixed payments paid by the public sector to the private sector in availability based PPPs 
over the period of the contract usually between 30-35 years. User charges refer to toll revenue recouped through toll 
charges by the private sector on toll based PPPs. 
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of PPP capital expenditure, is the most important area in terms of the Irish PPP programme, with 
the improvement of the road network being seen as key to the continuing economic development 
of the country.   
The total capital investment in the Irish National Development Plan is €79.5 billion with 
transport investment the largest area at €32.914 billion. PPP transport investment therefore 
represents 27% of overall transport investment and 11.2% of overall capital investment in the 
Irish National Development Plan (Ireland’s National Development Plan, 2007). Subsequent to 
the NDP 2007-2013, the Government has recently announced a stimulus plan of a further €1.4 
billion PPP investment aimed at creating employment and economic growth (Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, 2012). 
 
We now turn our attention to some of the recent changes in the PPP regulatory market. 
 
3. Changes in the regulatory framework in the PPP market 
 
The recent  global financial crisis  may be the worst the world has experienced since the Great 
Depression (Claessens et al., 2010, p.269), as the magnitude  of the crisis is evident by  the fact 
that Government bailouts have not so far helped to solve it (Crotty, 2009, p.1). Ireland was not 
immune from this crisis, and in September 2008 it experienced a major domestic banking crisis 
due to the demise of Lehman Brothers, which exposed a gap of approximately €200 billion 
between bank loans and deposits (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012, p. 802). This was primarily due 
to Irish banks engaging in poor risk management practices (O Sullivan and Kennedy, 2010) and 
reckless activity. The inability to raise funds on international markets, coupled with budgetary 
pressures and poor regulation, contributed to Irelands economic and financial problems.  In order 
to help resolve the crisis the Irish Government decided on a bailout, thus guaranteeing the 
liabilities of the banks (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012). 
 
A number of significant economic factors,  such as  asset price inflation, disparities in current 
accounts, high leverage and credit becoming easily available, have made the crisis more acute 
worldwide (Claessens et al., 2010, p.270),  and the availability of credit for the PPP market more 
difficult (Burger et al., 2009; Farquharson and Encinas, 2010; Connolly and Wall, 2011, OECD 
2012).  
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The global crisis has also engendered significant debate on risk management in the banking 
sector, which has led to considerable revision of regulatory frameworks (Vásquez and Federico, 
2012, p. 3).  Basel III
10
 was approved in 2010 by the G20 in response to the global financial 
crisis and to reconfigure the approach to regulatory and risk matters (PWC, 2011) in the 
financial sector, in an effort to ease future economic shocks (KPMG, 2011, p. 7).  Arguably, 
Basel III is expected to impact on the lending capacity of banks with the liquidity ratio 
requirements exerting pressure on the ability of banks to engage in short term lending (KPMG, 
2011). Vecchi et al. (2013) contend that this  has implications for banks’ lending to PPP 
concessionaire companies, with the Basel III stability ratios making PFI loans more expensive 
(HM Treasury, 2012). The global financial crisis may therefore  have caused  a decrease in the 
number of lenders to PPP projects (World Bank, 2012, p.54) and in fewer projects reaching 
financial closure in addition to an increase in interest costs for PPPs (Farquharson and Encinas, 
2010). This is also clearly apparent in Ireland as the global financial crisis has resulted in 24 
projects being abandoned or postponed due to a dearth of finance and an increase in the cost of 
finance (Reeves, 2013, p.6-7).   
 
According to a recent  House of Commons (2010, p.5) report,  finance costs for PFI increased by 
up to 33% in 2009, and both bond and bank finance have been restricted substantially 
(Wagenvoort et al., 2010), with the increased financing costs impacting considerably on VFM 
(NAO, 2010).  Additional regulatory changes may also have a negative effect on funding for 
infrastructure investment. These measures include the Solvency II Directive, which has 
implications for insurance firms in the EU, and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers EU 
Directive for asset managers (OECD, 2012, p.33). 
 
A recent report by EPEC (2013a) confirmed that as a result of the financial crisis, PPP activity 
has fallen substantially in Europe. For 2012, the volume of PPP activity was at its lowest level 
for 10 years. During this period, PPP deals were closed in only nine countries. The cumulative 
value of these deals was €11.7 billion, with the transport sector accounting for the majority of 
PPP investment (EPEC, 2013a). Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, however, the value of PPP 
activity was approximately €29.6 billion, with 136 PPP projects (Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010 
p.7).  
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 Basel III signifies the most significant regulatory changes that the banking sector has seen in decades. The 
primary aim of Basel III is to improve financial stability and to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements so that 
governments will not have to bail out banks in the future (PWC, 2011).  
8 
 
 
 
4. Risk and Uncertainties in PPP Projects 
 
Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p.376) point out that risk involves the assignment of probabilities and 
calculation of expected outcomes for a myriad of different scenarios.  They argue that the 
possibility of different outcomes amplifies the difficulties in managing risk in PPP (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005).   It can be very difficult to distinguish between risk and uncertainty and this has 
raised considerable debate in the academic literature (see for example, Froud, 2003; Broadbent 
et al., 2008). Risks can be quantified; however uncertainties tend to be more subjective and 
difficult to value (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).  
 
Demand risk emanates within the operational phase, but its pricing occurs before the PPP 
becomes operational.  In road PPP projects there are a plethora of different risks such as demand, 
credit, termination, landowner, construction and operational risk, and the stakeholders will have 
different perceptions on what they consider to be the key risks.  Risks can manifest themselves 
and become more profound over time in the PPP contract.  The perceptions that stakeholders 
have on risk can change over time, particularly after a PPP project becomes operational.  The 
treatment of qualitative items such as broad societal benefits in the PPP process is difficult to 
quantify.  Pollock et al. (2004) recognise that the societal implications of risk transfer needs to 
be audited more in PPPs, while Broadbent et al. (2008) argue that more research is needed into 
the qualitative aspects of risk in PPPs. 
 
The next section discusses these risk implications for payment mechanisms in road PPPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Payment Mechanisms and their implications for the transfer and pricing of demand risk 
in road PPPs 
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There are a number of different payment mechanisms that can be used in PPP roads, including 
hard tolls, availability payments and shadow tolls
11
 (Siemiatycki and Friedman, 2012).  The 
payment mechanism chosen will have implications for how demand risk is managed in road 
PPPs.  The transfer and pricing of demand risk deviates in each model which are now examined 
in turn. 
5.1. Hard tolls are operated by the SPV, which bears demand risk.  Such PPPs should be largely 
self sufficient with small operational and construction payments provided in some instances, 
whereby there is very little burden on taxpayer’s funds.  Hard toll PPPs may also provide 
adequate incentives for the SPV and encourage greater enterprise and performance because of 
their upside potential when demand levels exceed expected levels.  This encourages the SPV to 
ensure a high quality road, with minimal queuing and traffic disruptions, in order to increase 
their traffic levels. The public sector through the contractual provisions for demand risk in Irish 
toll road PPPs also gain through revenue share when demand exceeds expected levels
12
 (NRA, 
2012). Arguably, this encourages greater co-operation between the public and private sectors.  If 
the requisite traffic does not arise on the scheme, users fees may be insufficient and increased 
toll levels, grants or subsidisation from the Government may be necessary (Acerete et al., 2010).  
 
5.2. In availability based PPPs, demand risk resides with the public sector. A fixed unitary 
payment is paid by the Government to the SPV over the project’s lifecycle, subject to the SPV 
meeting performance and availability criteria whereby there is less incentive for the SPV to 
improve performance. The level of traffic on the road will have no impact on this payment 
(Siemiatycki and Friedman, 2012). Unitary payments do not begin until the PPP becomes 
operational.  In this arrangement, the SPV is also penalised if they close the road for a particular 
reason such as poor weather conditions or due to an accident.  The onus is on the SPV to be 
proactive and deal with any problems such as maintenance and accidents as they arise. In more 
recent road schemes in the UK, availability and performance criteria have been used more 
frequently (Acerete et al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
11
 Shadow toll schemes are not being used in the Republic of Ireland. 
 
12
 A recent report by the CAG (2012) indicated that in 2011 the NRA received €1.18 million in terms of revenue 
share in toll road PPP contracts. A few of the interviewees in this study confirmed that revenue share is being 
achieved on the Dundalk Western Bypass and Kilcock Kinnegad schemes, but not on the Rathcormac-Fermoy 
scheme.  
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5.3. Shadow tolls are financed through exchequer finance, which essentially results in the 
taxpayer paying for the PPP.  These have been in operation in the UK for a number of years.  In 
shadow tolls the sponsoring authority pays the private sector based on the type of vehicle and not 
just the number of road users per kilometre. This is necessary because the longer/heavier 
vehicles tend to do more damage which increases maintenance costs. Therefore, relative pricing 
for different types of demand is important as there are different incentives for the operator.  The 
level and types of traffic influence the extent of the shadow toll payment and the private sector 
shoulder the downside demand risk.  With a shadow toll, demand risk is arguably transferred to 
the SPV.  However, in the UK, it is pointed out that the Highways Agency may assume demand 
risk if demand fluctuated in ways beyond the realm of control of the SPV (Edwards et al., 2004, 
p. 114-115).  In such an arrangement, the procuring authority pays for the road to facilitate the 
users.  With respect to shadow tolls in the UK, traffic estimates were found to be quite accurate 
(Edwards et al., 2004).  Nonetheless, as with availability based schemes, the SPV is penalised if 
road availability, adequate safety levels, performance and traffic flow are not maintained (see 
Table 1 below for a comparison of the different payment mechanisms).  The contract may be 
rescinded if the SPV does not manage the road appropriately (Edwards et al., 2004).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Some private constructors may prefer availability types of PPPs to hard tolls, as Hayford (2011) 
has recently indicated, because in shadow and availability based PPP models, demand risk is 
retained by the public sector.   
 
6. Demand Risk 
For the purpose of this paper, we examine demand risk under three distinctive headings; 
allocation and transfer of demand risk from the public to the private sector, pricing of demand 
risk by the SPV, and finally changing stakeholders perceptions’ on the transfer and pricing of 
demand risk.  We will next consider each of these issues in turn.   
 
6.1. Allocation/Transfer of Demand Risk in road PPPs 
 
Risk allocation is fundamental to the PPP process, as the overriding goal of the public sector is 
to optimally allocate risk rather than increase the actual level of risk transfer to the private sector 
(Corner, 2006).  Hood et al. (2006, p. 48) state that in PPP projects ‘the public sector will always 
11 
 
be the risk bearer of last resort’, essentially meaning the taxpayer retains the risk. Risk transfer is 
a very subjective process and involves the assignment of probabilities. It is the central tenet 
behind achieving VFM in PPPs.  Hood et al. (2006) express concern that governments 
sometimes exaggerate the extent of transferred risk to the private sector, thus resulting in the 
private sector gaining excessive profits. Acerete et al. (2010) argue that risk transfer cost the UK 
Highways Agency considerably in UK road PPPs. Furthermore they point out that using private 
funds in roads has benefitted contractors, operators and their financiers as opposed to the 
taxpayer. Asenova and Beck (2010) believe that the senior debt financiers want to ensure that as 
many risks as possible in the PPP process are transferred to other parties, in order to minimise 
their exposure to risk, despite the subcontractors’ capacity to assume the risks being 
questionable.   
  
Many PPPs have failed across Europe due to demand risk being apportioned to the private sector 
(OECD, 2008). Jupe (2011) refers to problematic PPPs in the UK transport sector, and questions 
the Governments beliefs that these PPPs would lead to greater VFM and effective risk transfer. 
The highly controversial London Underground PPP, for example, required significant subsidies 
from the Government and 95% of the senior debt on the project was guaranteed by the 
Government. The PPP was a financial disaster and eventually had to be transferred back to the 
public sector (Jupe, 2011). Hard toll PPP failures have also been notable across Chile (Vassallo, 
2006) and Spain (Acerete et al., 2009).  In Australia, the Government did not intervene in the 
Cross City Tunnel project when demand failed to emerge and the inability of the SPV to pay the 
interest on the loans led to it going into administration (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007). Hard toll 
PPPs have performed poorly across Central and Eastern Europe too, with overoptimistic traffic 
estimates evident and Government intervention was required with many contracts renegotiated 
(Brenck, Beckers, Heinrich and Von Hirschhausen, 2005). Such Government intervention may 
be in the form of state guarantees, renegotiated contracts or transfers (Albalate and Bel, 2009). 
Perhaps a bigger danger in PPP contracts is where the SPV perceive that implicit guarantees may 
be provided (Shaoul et al., 2008) and sometimes companies may strategically underbid also 
because they enjoy a close relationship with the Government and feel that it will be easy to 
renegotiate the contract. In this regard, they may convince the Government to help them if low 
traffic levels are evident (Albalate and Bel, 2009). 
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EPEC (2011) recognising the difficulties with funding infrastructure projects in Europe, recently 
published a document promoting state guarantees (SGs)
13
 for PPPs in order to improve the risk 
allocation process from the perspective of the SPV.  Such guarantees are advocated for a number 
of reasons including, instilling confidence among funders, protecting the credibility of projects 
and they may also be used to mitigate project risks such as demand risk where lenders are 
apprehensive about potential revenue flow from the project.  Although state guarantees are a 
very useful mechanism to reduce risk, EPEC are keen that optimal risk allocation and VFM are 
not affected by such guarantees (EPEC, 2011) because when they are implemented, the taxpayer 
is effectively shouldering the risk. As Acerete et al. (2010) suggest, political commitment is 
essential to ensuring private finance projects either have the requisite demand or receive 
subvention payments where necessary to ensure their long term viability. Demand risk can 
therefore be very much politically motivated in that Government may directly intervene in 
underperforming PPPs and bail them out (Acerete et al., 2010).  Wettenhall (2007) argues that 
the SPV will often have considerable political influence which may undermine the extent to 
which underperformance in contracts is penalised. Such political clout for the SPV was evident 
in Spanish healthcare PPPs (Acerete et al., 2011). Shaoul et al., (2008) also discuss the cost of 
PPP failure using the Skye Bridge and Dartford Crossings examples where the Government 
ultimately bore significant risks and costs. They argue that, ultimately risk is a political decision 
(Shaoul et al., 2008) as toll schemes reward the financiers at the expense of the taxpayer (Shaoul 
et al., 2011).  
 
One of the other changes taking place in roads PPP market, as a result of the financial crisis, 
seems to be the balance of risk distribution with more mixed toll mechanisms
14
 emerging and 
more revenue guarantees and government supports being provided on schemes (Kappeler and 
Nemoz, 2010).   
 
6.2. Pricing of Demand Risk in Road PPPs 
 
Pricing of demand risk in PPPs is usually undertaken by the private sector once they are 
allocated the risks in the PPP process and is directly related to estimating traffic levels. Traffic or 
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 According to EPEC (2011, p.5) “State Guarantees are defined as agreements under which a sovereign or 
assimilated entity (“Government”) agrees to bear some or all of the downside risks of a PPP project”. 
 
14‘“Mixed” tolls include a number of constellations whose payment structures may vary considerably in terms of 
risk allocation between the public authority and the private partner’ (Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010, p. 26-27). 
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revenue risk in PPPs is important to examine because toll revenue and the financial robustness of 
the PPP are contingent upon demand.  In toll road PPPs, various factors will impact on demand 
such as economic growth, gross domestic product, development in the region and the risk of 
diversion to alternative routes.  Demand risk has a profound effect on financial risk as revenue 
from tolls can help to meet interest repayments and is related to other risks such as macro-
economic, interest rate, residual value and operational risk.  
 
Shaoul et al. (2006, p.263) point out that ‘traffic flow forecasting is not an exact science’ thus 
amplifying the difficulties in pricing demand risk.  Bain (2009) outlines how many investors are 
deceived by traffic forecasts generated from traffic experts.  The availability of historical data 
can impact on how accurately demand risk is priced by the SPV and generally the more 
aggressive they are on traffic volume, the greater the chance of them winning the contract.  The 
senior lenders also have their own auditors and traffic advisers but the SPVs are normally far 
more aggressive than the lenders when pricing demand risk.  Bain (2009) refers to a number of 
factors that lead to an optimism bias from an SPV perspective in traffic forecasting including 
inaccurate past trends, irrational consumers and assuming high initial demand levels.  Vassallo 
(2007) points out that such opportunistic bids result from the strategic behaviour of bidders to 
win contracts rather than traffic modelling errors.   
 
In the next section we examine some of the Government’s key assumptions on these issues 
before explaining the research methods used in the study. 
 
6.3. Government Assumptions on the Transfer and Pricing of Demand Risk 
 
There have been significant guidelines produced in the Republic of Ireland on how risk should 
be managed in PPPs. In this section, we provide extracts from Government guidelines and 
publications which are available in the public domain on how demand risk should be transferred 
and priced in PPPs.  The overriding view is that the Government expect that risk should be 
allocated equitably in the PPP process.  
 
The Department of Finance claim that optimal risk transfer and VFM are at the fulcrum of 
successful PPPs. The Department of Finance (2006b, p.14) outline that: 
 
14 
 
Risk is inherent in the management of all projects; In PPP projects achieving optimal risk transfer is 
one of the key means of securing value for money for the exchequer. The underlying principle in risk 
transfer in PPPs is that responsibility for the risks should rest with the party best placed to manage 
them. When considering risk transfer to the private sector, state authorities should keep this principle 
in mind and work towards the optimal level of risk transfer rather than a maximum level. The private 
sector will charge for each risk that they take on so there is a point at which risk transfer ceases to 
represent Value for Money. 
 
The Department of Finance (2007, p.22) also claim that the use of toll revenue  to remunerate 
the private sector should be considered if possible: ‘A revenue stream from third party income15 
can reduce the overall cost of funding a project and the potential to generate such income should 
always be considered, on a realistic basis’.  
 
The global financial crisis has exacerbated the difficulties in obtaining funding for PPP projects 
and in light of the current financial difficulties, HM Treasury (2009, p. 9) have also recognised 
the importance of equitable risk transfer in order to ensure that the financial market will take on 
PPP projects in the future. The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2011, p. 46) 
acknowledge the difficulties with funding; however projects should not go ahead unless they 
lead to VFM 
PPPs will continue to have a role to play in the delivery of key social infrastructure 
projects to meet remaining deficits in particular additional Schools Bundles and projects 
in the Health Sector. The private funding market has, however, been particularly 
challenging for the past number of years. Nonetheless, for those sectors where there are 
clear and pressing infrastructure requirements and where the PPP model can offer value 
for money, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, in consultation with the 
NDFA (as statutory financial adviser on all projects), will continue to work with 
Government Departments and agencies and other relevant stakeholders to help access 
private funding. 
 
The Department of Finance (2007, p.17) stress the importance of the most accurately priced PPP 
bids being accepted. 
 
When considering the figures to include in the Value for Money Comparison, the 
sponsoring agency should use figures based on the demand forecasts that underpin third 
party income in the Public Sector Benchmark; the highest ranking bidder’s demand 
forecasts should not be used. The NDFA will provide advice on how to address third 
party income in the Value for Money Comparison. (Italics added for emphasis) 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Third party income refers to user fees in the form of toll revenues. In the bidding process the more income the 
SPV estimate they will receive from third party income, the lower the NPV of their tender will be.   
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In essence, this suggests that, in their bid to secure the contract, the SPV should accurately price 
demand risk as opposed to under pricing it and allowing for a greater level of third party income. 
 
 
7. Research Methods 
 
Although case study research is not generalisable, it allows the researchers to evaluate key 
findings and emerging ideas (Nisar, 2007).  Moreover Yin (1989) outlines that the use of 
multiple case studies facilitates comparisons and can improve reliability and validity.  In-depth 
case studies were conducted with key stakeholders in three operational Irish PPP roads.  Detailed 
case studies were developed through the examination of company reports, websites and 
documentation from which a detailed interpretative analysis was conducted.  We also analysed 
qualitative and financial data pertaining to the case studies on Irish PPP websites such as 
http://www.nra.ie/ and http://ppp.gov.ie/.  This coupled, with in-depth interviews with all of the 
relevant stakeholders in our case studies, has helped to gain a richer and deeper insight into these 
case studies.   
 
Semi structured interviews with 38 key stakeholders were carried out between February 2008 
and May 2012.  The stakeholders were initially contacted by letter and subsequently by follow 
up letters, e-mails and phone calls to encourage them to participate in the research.  Respondents 
were assured of their confidentiality and anonymity in the interviews.  The results from the 
interviews were triangulated with the extensive secondary data which we analysed to support our 
arguments.  All of the interviews were recorded using a tape recorder, and lasted approximately 
one to two hours.  The interviewees provided an insight into their experiences and interactions 
with demand risk in operational toll road PPPs. All the interviews were transcribed and coded 
using the QSR Nvivo 9 Qualitative data package, which facilitated the analysis of Government 
publications with reference to the transfer and pricing of demand risk. A database was developed 
for each of the case studies and this proved to be very useful. This involves having a coherent 
structure for managing important documents (Yin, 1989). Within Nvivo, all of the interview data 
and information relating to each individual case study was saved under each case study code.  A 
retrievable database helps to address reliability concerns with case studies as it provides the 
opportunity to access the evidence and not just using written details (Yin, 1989). 
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For each of the three case studies, interviews were held with contractors, operators, financiers, 
equity financiers, SPV company members, technical advisors and traffic auditors (Details of the 
interview schedule are provided in tables 2 and 3).  This helped to ensure consistency across our 
case studies.  The traffic auditors/technical advisors are very important as they help to price 
demand risk in road PPPs.  Interviews were also held with representatives of the NRA, National 
Development Finance Agency (NDFA) and Department of Transport Tourism and Sport as they 
are responsible for allocating and transferring demand risk in Irish toll road PPPs.  Further 
interviews were also held with the Irish PPP unit, Irish Congress of Trade Unions and Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation as they also play a prominent role in Irish PPPs. Follow 
up interviews were held in May 2012 to help evaluate changing perceptions. Details of the 
follow up interviews are provided in table 3.  
 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
8. Empirical Findings of the Study 
 
The empirical findings of our case study research are provided within the context of the research 
questions stated in the introduction of this paper.  The overall interview findings are summarised 
in Tables 4 and 5 for convenience reasons.  Table 4 summarises the interview data on the 
transfer of demand risk in hard toll PPPs and Table 5 summarises the data on the pricing of 
demand risk in hard toll PPPs.  We report and discuss our findings for each of these questions in 
turn.  This is then followed by the differences in perceptions among the stakeholders interviewed 
and a comparison between stakeholders’ perceptions and best practice advocated by the 
Government on the transfer and pricing of demand risk. Finally, we discuss changing 
stakeholders’ attitudes on the management of demand risk and provide pointers to address some 
of the implications for PPP policy.  Throughout the findings section, quotations obtained from 
the interviews across the case studies are used to support the empirical findings.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
8.1. Transfer of Demand Risk from the Public to the Private Sector 
 
As indicated in Table 4,  the majority of the senior debt financiers believe that it is not effective 
to transfer demand risk to the SPV as happens in hard toll PPPs.  The general consensus from the 
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senior debt financiers across the case studies is that demand risk should be retained by the public 
sector and that shadow or availability type schemes are preferable as explained by one of the 
financiers on case study 2:  
 
Shadow tolls are more attractive to financiers. They are much less risky than hard toll 
projects. Demand risk is so difficult to estimate. (With) hard toll projects we have 
reached the conclusion that we are no longer interested in financing them, the risk is too 
significant. 
 
 
Another senior debt financier involved in case study 1 pointed out a number of risks involved in 
hard toll roads and in particular the complexities involved with having to manage demand risk 
after it has been transferred to them: 
 
Hard toll roads are inherently risky. The incidence of default in projects that we have 
financed is very low because that will impact on how we formalise our risk strategy. 
We tend to focus on the less risky projects. We have been much more competitive on 
winning mandates where there are unitary based cash flows. These models are recession 
proof. We have been less competitive on those projects where you are taking more 
demand risk. That might explain why we finance only one toll road in Ireland. Demand 
risk is the black box risk in toll road PPPs.  
 
 
Although the senior debt financiers had a preference for the availability type model, the general 
consensus from the senior debt financiers across all the case studies is that sovereign risk is now 
becoming a major issue. Akbiyikli et al. (2011) found that financiers in their study also 
questioned the ability of the exchequer to meet unitary payments.  
 
 
The equity financiers in the SPV across all the case studies had an appetite for risk and assumed 
all of the downside risk as well as the upside potential associated with demand risk in toll road 
PPPs. An examination of the composition of the members of the SPV in the case studies 
provided in Appendix 1 shows that each of the case studies has a number of different equity 
investors. These investors include the contractors and operators on the schemes.  
 
In contrast to the senior debt financiers, the equity financiers would support the Governments 
claims that there is equitable risk transfer in toll road PPPs.  As indicated in Table 4 above, the 
majority of the SPV equity financiers seem to suggest that they are happy to assume this risk, 
due to the profits that can emanate from this type of payment mechanism and that this 
encourages the entrepreneurial spirit of the SPV.  In this context, the equity financiers see hard 
toll roads as an opportunity to make more money as one of the equity investors on case study 3 
explained:  
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There is not too much incentive for a concessionaire in an availability payment PPP. 
They get the same money irrespective of how they perform… There is very little to play 
around with… It is true that there is not demand risk, but you also do not have the 
opportunity either. We look at demand risk as an opportunity, the more traffic you get 
the more money you get. 
 
In contrast to the overriding belief from the equity investors that hard toll road PPPs are 
preferable, as highlighted by one of the equity investors on case study 2, there is also some merit 
in the availability model where demand risk is not transferred by the public sector: 
 
Availability based roads are a lot more preferable because they are easier to get people 
interested in the project, particularly from a funding point of view. It is cleaner and it is 
neater and it has less risk. Toll road projects are risky projects for all involved, 
shareholders and funders. 
 
It is possible in a PPP to transfer a multitude of risks to subcontractors such as design and 
construction risk.  Demand risk, however, is not transferable by the SPV to a subcontractor.  In 
hard toll roads, the SPV usually assumes this risk and the repayment of the loans to the senior 
lenders will be contingent on the project’s robustness.  As one advisor on case study 2 explained, 
the senior debt financiers want as many stakeholders as possible, including the contractors and 
operators, to have equity in the project as this encourages risk sharing including the sharing of 
demand risk and facilitates better risk management: 
 
The senior lender wants everybody to be tied into the scheme including the advisors so 
everybody is sharing the risk… They are all equipped at managing risk and will manage 
risk to their own advantage. 
 
 
Table 4 shows that all the procuring authorities and public sector organisations believe that the 
SPV is best equipped at managing demand risk and that demand risk should be transferred to the 
SPV where it is viable to do so and offers VFM.  As one of the public sector officials explained, 
market forces significantly influence how the Government ultimately allocate demand risk: 
 
Clearly if there are opportunities for us to do further toll roads we will do them. There 
are other options that we can use. There has to be sufficient demand… Toll road PPPs 
are a free road from the point of view of the exchequer.  
 
A traffic auditor on case study 3 questioned the equitability of transferring demand risk to the 
SPV in hard toll PPPs, viewing a risk sharing approach as more appropriate: 
 
I am not sure that the Government should be awarding contracts to optimistic bids. 
These projects are likely to come under stress. While some revenue risk should be taken 
by the private sector, some should be covered by the Government. 
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The aforementioned findings suggest that the senior debt financiers are risk averse and believe it 
is more effective if demand risk is retained by the public sector. The equity investors are willing 
to assume demand risk due to the incentives it provides while the Government will seek to 
transfer demand risk in circumstances where it is viable to do so and provides VFM.   
8.2. Pricing of Demand Risk by the Private Sector 
We also sought to ascertain the interviewees’ perceptions of the SPV’s ability to accurately price 
demand risk when bidding for PPP contracts.  This is an important question because the SPV 
must price demand risk accurately in order to effectively manage the whole project.  However, 
in order to win the PPP contract in the first place, there are incentives for the SPV to underprice 
demand risk by allowing for a significant amount of third party income to be received in their 
bid. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the senior debt financiers (0%) unequivocally concur that the SPV 
price demand risk inaccurately in PPP.  The senior debt financiers therefore usually also estimate 
traffic in hard toll PPP schemes.  They employ traffic forecast auditors and technical advisors to 
review the traffic estimates that have been generated by the equity investors in the SPV.  We 
found that the banks are always interested in the worst case scenarios on traffic and are reluctant 
to finance hard toll PPPs due to the significant risks involved and the difficulty in accurately 
pricing demand risk.  We also found a change in attitude from some of the banks involved in our 
case studies in that they are beginning to look for revenue guarantees from the Government.  
Although such guarantees were not provided in our cases studies, in two recent PPP projects 
minimum revenue guarantees were provided to the SPV.
16
 
 
A senior debt financier on case study 2 explained at interview the problems in pricing demand 
risk in hard toll roads: 
 
Hard toll projects, we have reached the conclusion that we are no longer interested in 
financing them. The risks are too significant in them. The risks of trying to project 
traffic are significant. Probably in over half the projects we have done, we have been 
severely disappointed by the actual traffic we are getting on the road. In some cases 
traffic was 50% less. 
 
                                                 
16
 In the Clonee Kells toll road PPP, located in the Meath region of the Republic of Ireland, and the Limerick Port 
tunnel PPP, minimum revenue guarantees are provided by the Government to protect financiers.    
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The Government should not accept forecasts which are strategically underbid and have an 
optimism bias, but as one of the senior debt financiers on case study 1 explained, the 
competitors’ aggressive rather than accurate outlook in pricing traffic resulted in a loss of 
contracts for them: 
 
We have seen certain toll road projects, especially ones that we have not participated in, 
where we have said to the client, this is the cover ratio that we want you to have in your 
forecasts. These are the growth rates that we think are reasonable and they have lost the 
concession. In our view our client lost the contract not because they had done anything 
wrong but because the competitor has taken a much more aggressive outlook on traffic. 
We prefer not to be involved in a project where the contractor is expecting the lender to 
take an excessive outlook on traffic that is not actually supported by actual evidence. 
 
The lenders apprehensiveness to pricing demand risk was highlighted by one of the traffic 
auditors on the same case study at interview: 
 
I don’t think I have seen any case where the lenders have pushed the sponsor’s forecasts  
up… You look at the risks from a different perspective when you work for the SPV and 
lenders. The lenders will often look for a 95% worst case scenario for the project. The 
sponsors will never ask us to provide that, so you must understand the assumptions are 
different. Sometimes we are asked to even provide a 99% worst case scenario by the 
lenders.... When we work for the sponsor they look for the best case scenario.  
 
Once demand risk is transferred to the private sector in hard toll PPPs, it is essentially shared by 
the equity and debt holders.  As explained by one of the equity financiers at interview on case 
study 3, however, the majority of the equity financiers feel they are competent and have the 
expertise to accurately price demand risk:  
 
Demand risk is a risk we take. We like it. We have been operating motorways for many 
years. In our case we prefer the hard toll model. You are taking a big risk, but at the end 
you are getting a higher return…We are very competitive and aggressive in our pricing 
of demand risk. We have the expertise to manage that risk.  
 
 
Although the public sector believe that the SPV are conservative in pricing demand risk, they 
recognise that some risk taking is necessary in order to win the PPP contract, which does not 
correspond with Government guidelines advocating that demand risk should be accurately 
priced.  Conservative bids simply won’t be successful according to this public sector official: 
I think what you see more than anything is conservative approaches, certain banks 
depending on who they align themselves with will be conservative and certain bidders 
will be very conservative. They will bring down the traffic levels, just to be sure to be 
sure. And the trouble is they are going to lose the bid because they are being too 
cautious, so there is a level of intelligent risk taking that is necessary in order to win 
projects like this.  
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The public sector finds it very difficult to say no to an optimistic tender, as reputable firms with 
considerable experience are bidding for the projects: 
 
We would look at their tender and we would take a view on the robustness of their 
tender.  If we thought their tender was way off, we would make a decision, but that is a 
decision you make very carefully because these guys as I say are major firms and if 
they took a view they might say excuse me no, we want this job no matter what. 
 
There were mixed views about the SPV’s ability to accurately forecast and price demand risk by 
independent auditors. In two of the case studies concern was expressed about the SPV’s ability 
to forecast accurately. In the third case study, one of the traffic auditors praised the traffic 
forecasting and pricing of demand risk by the SPV: 
 
I have seen traffic forecasts that are a lot worse. The client on this scheme are one of the 
most experienced toll road operators in the World....They are not messing about losing 
money on deals. They want to get good deals. They know they need to start with 
something that is reasonably good and I think that is what they did. 
 
Despite the majority of the SPV equity investors expressing that they can price demand risk, in 
some cases, as indicated by one of the equity financiers on case study 2, the private sector had 
difficulty in accurately estimating traffic flow because traffic forecasters both internal and 
external were often wrong and deviated considerably in their forecasts: 
 
When I ask the guys to generate traffic, I want something that is optimistic but realistic. 
You are pushing the boundaries but you are not been absolutely stupid. I have done 
these projects before and there is no point in being over optimistic and the traffic never 
comes. It is a dark art, a difficult art. Hindsight is a wonderful thing but I think our 
tender was optimistic but achievable. 
 
Some of the technical advisers explained that many traffic forecasts were revised downwards 
due to the inability of the SPV to price demand risk accurately and problems with their 
methodologies.  Most of the interviewees across all our case studies think that the highly 
competitive nature of the Irish PPP market is encouraging the private sector to be aggressive 
when pricing demand risk.  However, some disagreement is evident within the SPV partners 
when pricing demand risk. The senior debt financiers are very apprehensive about demand risk, 
whereas the traffic forecasters for the equity investors are clearly over optimistic when pricing 
risk.  The traffic forecasters tend to overestimate the anticipated traffic volume. There was some 
concern that PPP projects are not being priced accurately to reflect the risks inherent in them, as 
indicated by one of the equity investors on case study 3: 
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The problem is that the competitors in the market are not seeing the PPPs as PPPs as 
such and therefore the premium that you are adding because you are buying so much 
more risk in a PPP contract has not been contemplated by other competitors….People 
don’t care about the risk they are pricing…We are aggressive but we don’t do stupid 
things.. We are not discounting the way other competitors are discounting. 
 
One of the reasons perhaps for this, as explained by one of the advisors, is that the equity 
financiers within the SPV downplay the risks: 
 
The SPV will assure everyone that there is no risk whatsoever and just sign up for it. 
The banks will go “No get a life and this is as risky as hell”…Any financier is always 
looking for some degree of comfort; they want to know the extreme downside. 
 
The above findings suggest that the equity investors are satisfied to price demand risk and feel 
they have the capability to do so. In contrast, serious reservations were expressed by the senior 
debt financiers regarding the capability of the equity investors to accurately price demand risk. 
Interestingly, the public sector indicated that some intelligent risk pricing may be required by the 
SPV to be successful in winning contracts. 
 
8.3. Changing stakeholder attitudes towards the transfer and pricing of demand risk 
 
Our findings also suggest that stakeholders’ attitudes may be changing in terms of risk transfer 
and possible Government intervention in hard toll PPPs. Demand risk is fully transferred to the 
SPV in hard toll PPPs, but some of the equity investors including an equity investor on case 
study 2 that we interviewed suggested that the Government may step in and renegotiate the 
contract to help the SPV should the PPP experience financial difficulty: 
 
Well the reality of it is and my argument is and also the way that it is shaping, is that 
ultimately if Road X was to start getting into problems then the Government would 
have to step in to deal with the funders. My view has always been that they are better 
off upfront saying right we will give you a commitment but that commitment will have 
certain legs to it... I think they hide behind it, all Governments hide behind this sort of; 
and say oh well it is recoursable; people are saying well we know ultimately that the 
Government will have to step in.  
 
Similarly, an SPV manager, in one of the other case studies, who explained that the SPV 
aggressively price demand risk in PPP also expressed the belief that the Government should 
renegotiate the contract with them in the event of financial difficulty: 
 
Letting businesses to fail is not good business for anybody. It is not good for the people 
who put in their equity, it is not good for the State, it is a bad signal because everybody 
got it wrong….I would say there is an argument to say well maybe the State needs to 
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have a secondary position….here is the safeguards and that is where maybe the 
floors for traffic should be or maybe have subvention payments or distress intervention. 
 
 
Although our findings indicate that the public sector prefer to transfer demand risk, we did find 
some evidence that suggests the public sector is changing its attitude in that they are becoming 
more concerned with the amount of risk transfer in road PPPs to the private sector: 
We were only interested in toll based PPP’s ….a free road essentially from the point of 
view of the exchequer with the user paying for it, and if the private sector was prepared 
to take on that risk then good luck to them but clearly we have to be careful to make 
sure that all the transferred risk is not so aggressive that we are going to leave 
companies in trouble. 
 
Another public sector official outlined that there are now extra provisions included in the 
contracts to ensure that they are financeable.  There is very little point in transferring excessive 
risk or having a contract that nobody wants to sign up to: 
I think the reality is that if you are signing a PPP deal now that a number of things are 
different. Firstly, the margins on the debt have increased. At the moment these margins 
are a bit higher. Secondly, there are additional provisions included in the contracts to 
reflect the market’s attitude at the moment. These contracts are very much driven by 
and reflected by market conditions. There is no use having a contract if nobody is going 
to sign it. 
Shaoul et al. (2012a) refer to the reputational risk attributed to PPP failure and consistent with 
this, the last thing that the procuring authority wants to see is a project failing as they recognise 
that this would send bad signals to the market. Notwithstanding this any potential intervention 
would have to be carefully considered as public money is at stake and the procuring authority 
indicated they would expect any potential loans or aid to be repaid by the SPV. Furthermore the 
public sector is mindful that if they do intervene in a struggling project it may set a dangerous 
precedent as a public sector representative explained at interview:  
 
Would the Government step in?  It is premature to know what the outcome of that 
would be, but it would be something that would be considered…. We don’t want to see 
a project fail because we know that it is not good for Ireland. It would be bad for future 
investment.  There are all these arguments as to why you would or would not do it. 
Equally we are not going to go and do something that leaves us exposed.  We have got 
precedent as well, there are ten projects out there, and you know if you do something 
for one, you are exposing yourself to other projects involved. 
 
These sentiments were echoed by one of the Government advisors in Irish PPPs who indicated 
that the Government may help the SPV when demand levels are low on the road: 
 
The consortium may come back and in some way look to open up negotiations again if 
demand has completely fallen away, but hopefully that won’t happen but it is in the 
back of your mind.   
24 
 
The majority of the senior debt financiers indicated that more specific guarantees such as 
minimum revenue and loan guarantees may be necessary for them to participate in future toll 
road PPPs. This was illustrated by a senior debt financier at interview who indicated that they 
would not become involved in future PPP projects unless the state underwrites considerably 
more risk in the future:  
 
We are now only focussing on guaranteed PPP projects going forward but that does not 
mean we won’t finance infrastructure projects?  No it does not. But now we will seek to 
be involved in just that part of the debt that has a direct guarantee from the Irish 
Government. 
Another public sector official acknowledged that guarantees may be necessary due to funding 
problems: 
As I have said to you already, the banks involved are much more risk averse, only 
relatively small projects have got away at the moment and the banks are raising issues 
about Government guarantees. 
 
 
Prior work has indicated that many risks are transferred from financiers of PPP schemes to 
subcontractors.  The above findings indicate that the public sectors understanding and treatment 
of risk transfer, and hence VFM, is a dynamic concept that has changed over time in the 
Republic of Ireland. The government is beginning to retain and share more of the risk in Irish 
road PPPs..  There are also some tentative suggestions from some of the interviewees that some 
risks may eventually be transferred back to the public sector. If the Government does provide a 
loan or subsidy to aid a struggling SPV, there is no guarantee it will be paid back, hence the 
taxpayer will have to unfairly shoulder the financial burden. The results of this study also 
suggest that a number of the equity investors also believe that the Irish Government may take on 
the risks if the projects were to experience financial difficulties.  This would result in the risk 
being passed to the taxpayer to the benefit of some other players.  
 
 
9. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
This paper has been chiefly concerned with examining changing stakeholders’ perceptions on 
the transfer and pricing of demand risk in Irish PPP roads. Within this context we examined 
perceptions on how demand risk is transferred from the public to the private sector, and priced 
by the SPV in PPPs. The findings are based on quotations from an extensive number of 
interviewees, and these have been selected as they highlight a general consensus on particular 
issues mentioned in the paper.  We also compared our findings with Government assumptions on 
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how demand risk should be transferred and priced in PPP.  Where appropriate quotations 
representing an opposing minority view have been provided. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that there are observable differences in the management of 
demand risk among the PPP stakeholders. Senior debt financiers are reluctant to finance hard toll 
PPPs due to their apprehensiveness over demand risk and are risk averse.  Our findings suggest 
that stakeholders’ perceptions, are changing and that the SPV, in light of the funding difficulties 
associated with PPPs at present, may require specific guarantees in the future in order to 
participate in road PPPs. The Government may be able to grant this, thus highlighting a possible 
significant change in its attitudes towards risk transfer. An example of this is evident in a 
recently signed road PPP deal in Ireland, whereby a standby credit facility was provided by the 
Irish Government through the National Pension Reserve Fund. This was necessary in order to 
ensure funding for the project (Sharma, 2013). Such changes have also been evident in a UK 
context where the Treasury established its Infrastructure Finance Unit in 2009 in order to 
provide loans for PPPs at comparable rates to commercial banks (Farquharson and Encinas, 
2010). Furthermore, the UK Government announced a UK Guarantees programme worth £40 
billion in July 2012 for a myriad of sectors, including transport, in order to assist funding given 
the current global financial difficulties (HM Treasury, 2012, p.25).  The PF2 document 
published by the Treasury in 2012, represents a new approach by the UK government to PFI 
projects.  The report was developed in response to a UK Government call for the assessment of 
PFI. This was in order to establish whether PFI was a good deal for the taxpayer and leads to 
VFM.  This coupled with the global financial crisis has led the UK government to propose this 
new model to encourage infrastructural investment from the private sector. Under this process 
the government will also invest equity in PPP projects, which will lead to more risk sharing 
between the public and private sectors (HM Treasury, 2012). 
 
PF2 is designed with the expectation of enticing long term investors such as pension funds as 
well as institutional investors into PPP projects. The increased use of EIB finance is also 
advocated by the Government in the report (HM Treasury 2012).  Similar to the UK, alternative 
sources of finance, such as pension funds and the obtaining of additional funding from the EIB 
have been proposed recently by the Irish Government (See for example, Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2011 and 2012). The PF2 model will be financed by up to 20-25% of 
risk capital, with equity invested from both the public and private sectors. More capital 
contributions from the Government at earlier stages of the projects are also proposed under the 
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PF2 model (HM Treasury, 2012, pp81-83), and this is something the Irish Government may also 
want to consider, especially due to the number of Irish PPP projects that have been postponed or 
abandoned  recently. 
 
Demand risk is perceived to be effectively transferred to the SPV by the equity financiers and 
the public sector.  The SPV equity holders appear to have an appetite for risk taking in hard toll 
roads due to the incentive to generate significant profits by getting more vehicles on the road.  
Senior debt financiers and consumer advisors, however, perceive demand risk that remains with 
the public sector to be more effective.  This is interesting because we find that the term 
‘effectiveness’ is perceived to mean different things to different stakeholders.  While the 
effective risk allocation, according to senior debt financiers, means leaving demand risk with the 
public sector – because they perceive that the public sector can better control and bear this risk – 
to the other financier’s effectiveness seem to relate to managing the whole project generally. 
Although the senior debt financiers have a preference for the availability based model, we found 
evidence to suggest that they are also concerned with sovereign risk in terms of the 
Government’s ability to meet unitary payments in future availability schemes.   
 
There are also differences in how demand risk is perceived to be accurately priced by the SPV.  
The senior debt financiers and traffic auditors are more conservative in their traffic estimates 
than the SPVs.  The equity investors within the SPV are aggressive rather than accurate in their 
pricing of traffic risk.  They see traffic risk as an incentive within the PPP, and transferring this 
risk to the SPV creates an incentive to efficiently manage the project more generally.  Winning 
the contract is their primary motive behind the under pricing of demand risk and we have some 
evidence to suggest that in one of the case studies unconventional traffic forecasting techniques 
were used by the SPV. The SPV members believe that the most optimistic bids are being chosen 
as opposed to the more realistic demand levels included in the Public Sector Benchmark (PSB). 
The rhetoric used by the Government in its guidelines on how demand risk should be priced in 
PPP appears to differ from what is actually occurring in reality. This raises the concern as to 
whether the Government actually care how accurately risk is priced in PPPs.  
 
A clear strategy is needed to develop future policy developments in PPPs. This requires a 
thorough understanding of how risks are dispersed and managed, especially given the current 
financial uncertainty. Ireland’s fiscal problems will impact on future PPP spending. The 
intention with PPP is that risks should be held by the party best able to manage them, and that 
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the risk is priced accurately in the PPP contract. A key finding of our research indicates that, 
given the competitive pressures, it is possible to strategically under price risk in the contract in 
order to try win a bid. Moreover, senior debt financiers’ preoccupation with reducing risk 
exposure through seeking minimum revenue and loan guarantees and transferring risk back to 
the public sector creates further policy implications for governments.  The impact that these 
findings have on VFM, the public sector and ultimately the taxpayer needs to be assessed on an 
ongoing basis especially as Government guidelines state the importance of optimal risk transfer 
and PPP contracts being accurately rather than aggressively priced. Our findings also provide 
support to the view that the allocation of demand risk may be based on sub-optimal risk 
allocation, and individual stakeholders will try tweak this process in order to diffuse risk to their 
advantage.  The inability of the equity and senior debt financiers in hard toll PPPs to transfer 
demand risk elsewhere ultimately may require the SPV to be rescued by the Government should 
financial difficulties emerge. Although the SPV may expect the government to intervene, the 
current difficulties in Irish public finances may limit any  financial support that the Irish 
Government may potentially provide the SPV. The Government should also be aware of the 
political costs associated with toll road PPP failures; as such failures heighten the fears of 
taxpayers about the use and viability of such PPPs.  
 
A recent report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) (2012) estimated that the 
Limerick Tunnel and Clonee Kells schemes have been expensive for the taxpayer costing €5.2m 
in 2011 and estimated to cost the Government €6.7 m in terms of guaranteed traffic levels on 
these two schemes in 2012.  In terms of revenue share, however, only €1.18 million was 
received on toll schemes in 2011. The CAG (2012) argue that there needs to be greater visibility 
in terms of future PPP commitments in the annual finance accounts and express the need for 
more VFM appraisals to be conducted on PPP projects in order to ascertain that they represent 
VFM. Future schemes in Ireland are likely to be availability based schemes with demand risk 
retained by the public sector (CAG, 2012). 
 
In the PPP game it would appear that the taxpayers are the losers, supporting the earlier work of 
Shaoul et al., (2011). Indeed the recent report by HM Treasury (2012) acknowledged that PFI 
has been poor VFM for the taxpayer with excessive risk transferred to the SPV.  Underwriting 
senior debt by the Government in hard toll PPPs may be necessary to ensure the future 
sustainability of the PPP toll road sector but at what cost to the tax payers and what cost to the 
pretence that the private sector contractors and financiers are taking on any risk at all. 
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In order to help stimulate private sector investment and alleviate concerns regarding demand risk 
in the early stages of projects, the EIB have recently introduced a loan guarantee instrument for 
Trans European Transport Network projects. Under this guarantee some of the senior debt may 
be guaranteed by the EIB (EPEC, 2011). This scheme may result, as Jupe (2012) argues, in the 
Government underwriting too much risk in the PPP market.  
 
Another important consideration is to evaluate whether the SPV believe that the Government 
will provide assistance in the event of the requisite traffic not emanating on the scheme and the 
PPP being in financial difficulty.  The findings of this study would suggest that some of the SPV 
members believe that the Government could possibly intervene when demand levels are low. 
Such behaviour inevitably raises further questions about how risk is initially allocated in PPP 
and, consequently, it is also important to consider how it affects the accountability, VFM and 
transparency of the PPP process.  
 
As PPPs become operational for longer time periods it would be interesting to examine if and 
why stakeholders’ risk perceptions change over time. It would also be useful to ascertain how 
malleable these differences are between the stakeholders in order to discharge PPP 
accountabilities. The consequences of these different perceptions and the frictions that manifest 
from these differences require further attention in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
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BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDIES 
Case study 1: Dundalk-Western Bypass  
The N1/M1 Dundalk Bypass scheme was part of the second tranche of PPPs implemented by the 
Government. The operation and maintenance of the tolling facilities opened in 2003 are also 
included in this PPP contract. Under the PPP agreement the existing toll plazas and electronic 
toll collection had to be updated. The period for the contract is 30 years in total. The PPP opened 
on September 26
th
, 2005, 5 months ahead of schedule. Celtic Roads Group (CRG) was 
successful in the tender for this project. CRG are required to invest and ensure that the road is at 
an adequate level prior to it been handed back to the NRA (www.nra.ie).  CRG comprises of 
ACS Dragados, National Toll Roads and Royal Bam represented by Ascon. All these companies 
hold an equal 33% stake in the SPV Consortium. 
 
 
Case study 2: Rathcormac-Fermoy 
The NRA proposed this project in June 2000.  Following a competitive tendering process, the 
contract was awarded to Direct Route LTD, comprising of a number of Irish companies such as 
Sisk, Lagan and Roadbridge and International companies such as Strabag and KBR. The 
contract is for a duration of 30 years and was signed in June 2004. Intolligent operate the toll 
plaza on behalf of Direct Route. They have an initial contract of 5 years to operate the toll 
plazas. This PPP has not been far away from controversy with many locals extremely opposed to 
it in the Watergrasshill area. A petition was signed and brought to that attention of the European 
Union. The road was officially opened on the 2
nd
 of October 2006. AIB and the EIB are the 
major financiers on this project.  The project is financed through 80% senior debt and 20% 
equity (www.nra.ie). There is also a revenue share stipulation within the contract whereby once 
traffic levels exceed 21,000 per day, Direct Route pay the NRA a share of the profits. 
Case study 3:  Kilcock-Kinnegad 
This project was initially included in the list of pilot PPP projects produced by the Government 
in 1999. It was the first PPP contract to be signed by the NRA in March 2003.  The contract was 
completed before the expected commencement date and opened on the 12
th
 of December 2004 
10 months ahead of schedule. The Eurolink Consortium was awarded this PPP contract. This 
consortium consists of Siac Construction Limited, a prominent Irish construction company and 
Cintra, a Spanish company with vast PPP experience worldwide. The contractor for the scheme 
is WestRoute Construction Joint Venture (www.nra.ie). The NRA has agreed to pay Eurolink 
€146m during construction and €6m in total during each year of operation. Eurolink and the 
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NRA also have a revenue share agreement in place whereby the NRA will receive a proportion 
of revenue based on toll levels. Eurolink assume all downside risk on this project however 
(www.nra.ie). 
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